

The Urgency of Establishing an MPR Honorary Court in Strengthening Legislative Ethics in Indonesia

Nia Laila Apriliani¹, Jefik Zulfikar Hafizd^{2*}, Am'mar Abdullah Arfan³,
Mohamad Rana⁴, Saiful Ansori⁵, Rohana Rohana⁶

^{1,2,3,4,5,6} Universitas Islam Negeri Siber Syekh Nurjati Cirebon, Indonesia

* correspondence email: jefik@uinssc.ac.id

Article History

Received: 23/07/2025; Reviewed: 07/03/2026; Accepted: 27/06/2026

Abstract: The purpose of this research is to examine juridically the urgency of establishing the Honorary Court of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat / MPR) as an ethical supervisory body in order to strengthen a clean, accountable, and integrity-based constitutional system. The method applied is a normative juridical approach through analysis of laws and regulations, relevant legal decisions, and ethical principles as stated in MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001. The novelty of this study lies in its focus on the MPR, which unlike the House of Representatives (DPR) with its Honorary Council, has not yet institutionalized an ethical body, thus leaving a legal and institutional gap that requires urgent attention. The findings of this study show that the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court is a crucial need to create an ethical supervision system that is both preventive and repressive toward its members, thereby enhancing institutional accountability. In conclusion, the existence of such an institution is expected to strengthen the legitimacy and public trust in the MPR's representative function, with the main recommendation being the drafting of internal regulations that define the structure, authority, and working mechanisms of the Honorary Court as an integral part of legislative institutional reform.

Keywords: MPR; Honorary Court; Legislative Ethics; Institutional; Integrity

Abstrak: Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengkaji secara yuridis urgensi pembentukan Mahkamah Kehormatan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) sebagai lembaga pengawas etik dalam rangka memperkuat sistem ketatanegaraan yang bersih, akuntabel, dan berintegritas. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah pendekatan yuridis normatif melalui analisis peraturan perundang-undangan, putusan hukum yang relevan, serta prinsip-prinsip etika sebagaimana tercantum dalam Ketetapan MPR Nomor VI/MPR/2001. Kebaruan penelitian ini terletak pada fokus kajian terhadap MPR yang hingga kini, berbeda dengan DPR yang telah memiliki Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan, belum membentuk lembaga etik serupa sehingga menimbulkan kekosongan hukum dan kelembagaan yang perlu segera diisi. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa pembentukan Mahkamah Kehormatan MPR merupakan kebutuhan mendesak untuk

*menghadirkan sistem pengawasan etik yang bersifat preventif dan represif terhadap anggota MPR, sekaligus meningkatkan akuntabilitas lembaga. **Kesimpulannya**, keberadaan lembaga ini diharapkan dapat memperkuat legitimasi dan kepercayaan publik terhadap fungsi representasi MPR, dengan rekomendasi utama berupa penyusunan regulasi internal yang mengatur struktur, kewenangan, dan mekanisme kerja Mahkamah Kehormatan sebagai bagian integral dari reformasi kelembagaan legislatif.*

Kata Kunci: MPR; Mahkamah Kehormatan; Etika Legislatif; Kelembagaan; Integritas.

1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of Members of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat / MPR) having high ethics and professionalism is closely related to their role as people's representatives who have a great responsibility in maintaining public trust. The enforcement of the code of ethics carried out by the Honorary Court of the People's Consultative Assembly aims to ensure that each member carries out his duties with integrity and in accordance with the applicable moral and legal rules.¹ Supervision of the enforcement of this code of ethics is necessary in order to create accountability and transparency in carrying out legislative functions, so as to avoid MPR Members from actions that harm the image of the institution and can maintain institutional integrity. With this supervision, it is hoped that a more professional and ethical work culture will be created, which will ultimately strengthen public trust in state institutions.²

In the Indonesian constitutional system, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has a very important position as a high state institution that functions to implement the principles of Pancasila democracy in the life of the state. As an institution consisting of representatives of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), the MPR has the authority to establish and amend the Constitution and direct the aspirations of the people.³ The function of the MPR in the constitutional system also includes moral and ethical responsibilities to maintain the values of honesty, justice, and integrity, which are in line with the principles of people's sovereignty.

The constitutional position of the MPR has undergone a fundamental transformation following the four rounds of constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002. Prior to the amendments, the MPR occupied the highest position in the Indonesian constitutional hierarchy as the supreme body of state sovereignty (*lembaga tertinggi negara*), holding authority to establish the Broad Outlines of State Policy (*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara/GBHN*) and to elect the President and Vice President. However, the post-amendment constitutional architecture no longer recognizes the MPR as the supreme state body. Instead, the amended Constitution repositions the MPR as a joint forum (*forum gabungan*) composed of members of the House of Representatives

¹ Zamharira Nurdin et al., "The Urgency of the Position of the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia According to the 1945 Constitution," *Journal of Lex Philosophy (JLP)* 5, no. 2 (2024).

² Yusri Munaf, Islamic University of Riau, 2015.

³ Made Oka Cahyadi Wiguna, "The Importance of Wisdom Principles Based on Pancasila in Indonesian Legal and Democratic Life," *Scientific Journal of Legal Policy* 15, no. 1 (March 26, 2021): 133.

(DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), with a more limited but constitutionally significant set of functions.⁴

This paradigmatic shift in the constitutional architecture of Indonesia carries important implications for how the MPR should be understood as an institution. The MPR is no longer a permanent deliberative body in the traditional sense, but rather an institution that convenes for specific constitutional purposes: amending and enacting the Constitution, inaugurating or dismissing the President and/or Vice President in accordance with constitutional provisions, and electing the President and Vice President in the event of a simultaneous vacancy. These functions, although numerically fewer than before the amendments, are of the highest constitutional order and directly affect the legitimacy of the entire governmental system. It is precisely because of this concentrated and irreversible constitutional authority that the integrity and ethical conduct of MPR members must be subject to a dedicated and robust oversight mechanism.⁵

The argument that ethical supervision through the DPR's Honorary Council (MKD) and the DPD's Honorary Body (BK) is sufficient to cover MPR members must be critically examined against the backdrop of this constitutional transformation. While it is true that MPR members are drawn from the DPR and DPD, their conduct when exercising MPR-specific functions falls outside the jurisdictional scope of either chamber's ethics body. When an MPR member votes on a constitutional amendment or participates in a presidential inauguration, they do so not as a DPR or DPD member, but as an MPR member a constitutionally distinct role that requires a correspondingly distinct mechanism for ethical oversight. Accordingly, the absence of a permanent, dedicated ethics body within the MPR represents not merely an administrative gap, but a structural vulnerability within Indonesia's post-amendment constitutional order.⁶

The urgency of the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court is increasing due to cases of ethical violations involving MPR members in recent years. These cases of violations include various aspects, ranging from abuse of power, violations of discipline, to actions that are contrary to the moral values of society. Not only tarnishing the image of the MPR in the eyes of the public, but these cases also have the potential to disrupt political stability and reduce the quality of decision-making in the country's institutions.⁷

Without an institution specifically tasked with supervising and cracking down on ethical violations within the MPR, the democratic process in Indonesia is in danger of losing its direction, and the public will become increasingly skeptical of state institutions. In this context, the MPR Honorary Court will not only act as a supervisor, but also as a mechanism that ensures that every action of MPR Members is in accordance with agreed standards of conduct and transparent to the public.

MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001 concerning the Ethics of National Life has defined the Ethics of National Life as a formulation that is sourced from religious

⁴ Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Konstitusi Dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia*, Edisi Revi (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2011).

⁵ Sri Soemantri Martosoewignjo, *Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia: Pemikiran Dan Pandangan* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2014).

⁶ Moh. Mahfud MD, *Politik Hukum Di Indonesia*, Revisi (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2012).

⁷ *Juridical Review of the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of Judges in the Perspective of Siyashah Syar'iyah*, n.d.

teachings, especially those that are universal, and the noble values of the nation's culture reflected in Pancasila as a basic reference in thinking, behaving and behaving in the life of the nation.⁸ Therefore, Pancasila must be understood not only as a source of law, but also as a source of ethics. Similarly, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia does not only contain constitutional law, but also contains constitutional ethical values which are also reflected in MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001, as a guideline for the ethics of the nation and state.⁹

The MPR already has rules on the Code of Ethics as stipulated in the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2/MPR/2010 concerning the Regulation of the Code of Ethics of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia.¹⁰ However, the enactment of the MPR Decree is considered less effective because it has not been accompanied by the establishment of ethics enforcement institutions like in other state institutions. The absence of ethics enforcement agencies in the MPR for approximately 15 years is considered contradictory, considering that the MPR has an important task to socialize the Four Pillars of Nationality, including MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001 concerning the Ethics of National Life. On the other hand, there is a view that the enforcement of the code of ethics for MPR members is sufficient in each institution that oversees the member. Article 2 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states that "The People's Consultative Assembly consists of members of the House of Representatives and members of the Regional Representative Council who are elected through general elections and further regulated by law." Based on this view, ethics enforcement agencies in the DPR and DPD are considered sufficient to deal with violations of the code of ethics of MPR Members.¹¹

In an effort to maintain the professionalism and accountability of the institution, the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court also aims to protect the constitutional rights of MPR Members who carry out their duties in accordance with the principles and ethics that have been set.¹² The MPR Honorary Court will be a forum for resolving internal conflicts and handling ethical violations that can provide independent, transparent, and accountable decisions. This process is expected to be able to reduce the potential for conflicts that can harm the performance of the MPR as a whole and keep this institution functioning optimally in carrying out its role to represent the interests of the people.

One of the cases of code of ethics violations that highlights the urgency of establishing an Honorary Court in the legislature is the involvement of some members in

⁸ Indonesia, Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic. "Number VI/MPR/2001 concerning the Ethics of National Life." Jakarta: *People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia*. 2001.

⁹ Sofi Rahma Dewi, "Legal and Moral Relations in the Ethical Enforcement System of General Election Organizers in Indonesia," *Acta Law Journal* 1, no. 1 (November 12, 2022).

¹⁰ "Pros and Cons of Internal and External Enforcement of Ethics," *Journal of Constitution and Democracy* 1, no. 1 (June 25, 2021).

¹¹ "Fernanda Hutabarat" (n.d.).

¹² Achmad Edi Subiyanto, "Designing the Authority of the Judiciary After the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution," *Constitutional Journal* 9, no. 4 (May 20, 2016): 661.

corrupt practices and abuse of authority. Such violations not only undermine the integrity of the individuals involved, but also defame the institution as a whole, reduce public trust, and undermine the oversight function that is supposed to be carried out.¹³ In this context, the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court is proposed as a mechanism that can provide stricter sanctions for violations of the code of ethics, so as to be able to improve the internal governance of the institution and prevent practices that are not in accordance with legislative ethics.

In addition, the existence of the MPR Honorary Court also reflects the commitment of the legislature in complying with the principle *of checks and balances*, where every action and decision of MPR members is always supervised and evaluated for the benefit of the wider community. Thus, the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court not only serves as a means of ethical supervision, but also as an important step in strengthening institutional integrity and providing a solid foundation for the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia.

Research related to the enforcement of the code of ethics in state institutions has previously been conducted, among others by Syarifuddin and Kemas Gerby Novario (2017) who examined the role of the Honorary Court of the Council (MKD) in maintaining the integrity and morality of members of the House of Representatives through monitoring, investigation, and the provision of strict sanctions against ethical violations.¹⁴ Another study by Zamharira Nurdin, A. Muin Fahmal, and Fahri Bachmid highlights the urgency of the Constitutional Court (MK) Honorary Assembly in maintaining the ethics and independence of constitutional judges, which is considered crucial to prevent ethical violations while ensuring that judges carry out their duties in accordance with constitutional principles, transparency, and accountability.¹⁵ However, until now there has been no research that specifically discusses the urgency of establishing an Honorary Court within the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Thus, this study has novelty because it not only highlights the urgency of the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court, but also examines its legal implications as well as the challenges and solutions that need to be formulated to ensure the effectiveness of the institution in enforcing the code of ethics and improving the integrity of legislative institutions.

This study seeks to explore the urgency of establishing an Honorary Court within the MPR as a means of enforcing the code of ethics and enhancing the integrity of legislative members. It also examines the legal implications and the perspective of *fiqh siyasah* on how such an institution could strengthen accountability and professionalism, while analyzing the juridical challenges that may arise and proposing solutions to ensure its effectiveness within the constitutional framework. In this regard, the study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the functions, structures, and mechanisms that can be applied in the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court, thereby reinforcing its role as a supervisory body to uphold ethical governance in the legislature.

¹³ Criminal Justice System and Reform Essay Thematic *Essay Law Students*, n.d.

¹⁴ Kemas and Novario, *DPR Honorary Council And The Enforcement Of The Code Of Ethics*.

¹⁵ Nurdin et al., "The Urgency of the Position of the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia According to the 1945 Constitution."

2. METHOD

This study employs a qualitative legal research method combining normative juridical and empirical juridical approaches. The normative approach is used to examine the constitutional and legal framework concerning legislative ethics, the institutional position of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), and the urgency of establishing an MPR Honorary Court within Indonesia's constitutional system. The legal materials analyzed include the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001 on the Ethics of National Life, MPR Decree Number 2/MPR/2010 on the Code of Ethics of the MPR, the MD3 Law, the MPR Rules of Procedure, official MPR documents, and other relevant regulations related to ethical governance in state institutions. In addition, Qur'anic verses and Hadith are used as ethical foundations to enrich the analysis from the perspective of Islamic legal values.

The empirical juridical approach complements the normative analysis by exploring how legislative ethics supervision is understood and practiced within the MPR. Empirical data were obtained through in-depth direct interviews with three informants, each selected purposively based on the relevance of their institutional position, role, and knowledge regarding the ethical framework of the MPR and the discourse on the establishment of the MPR Honorary Court. To support and enrich the interview data, the study also used additional written materials and documentary sources provided during the research process. The empirical data were analyzed qualitatively based on the results of the in-depth interviews and the supporting written sources by organizing the findings, identifying the main themes, interpreting the substance of the information obtained, and relating those findings to the normative legal materials examined previously. Through this method, the study formulates a comprehensive analysis of the urgency, legal implications, and institutional design of establishing an MPR Honorary Court in strengthening legislative ethics in Indonesia.

3. DISCUSSION

3.1. The Existing Framework of Legislative Ethics and Institutional Gaps in the MPR

Within the existing framework of legislative ethics in the MPR, the Honorary Court of the People's Consultative Assembly (Mahkamah Kehormatan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat / MK MPR) has been formally acknowledged in Article 56 of Regulation of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2024 concerning the Rules of Procedure, which states that "the Honorary Body is a non-permanent organ of the MPR." This provision shows that, although the MPR has recognized the need for an ethical mechanism, its current design remains temporary rather than institutionalized as a permanent body.¹⁶

The MPR Honorary Court (MK MPR) is a proposed institution to be established with the purpose of supervising the enforcement of the code of ethics and safeguarding the integrity of MPR members. Within the structure of Indonesia's constitutional system, the

¹⁶ Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, "Peraturan MPR Tentang Tata Tertib Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor 1," 2024.

MPR occupies a highly significant position as a supreme state body entrusted with strategic decision-making powers, including the authority to amend and enact the Constitution as well as to elect the President and Vice President in the event of a vacancy. The establishment of the MK MPR is therefore not only intended as an internal ethical supervisory mechanism, but also as a constitutional safeguard to ensure that such crucial functions are exercised with integrity, accountability, and adherence to ethical principles, thereby strengthening both the credibility of the institution and public trust in the legislative process.

The MPR Honorary Court (MK MPR) functions as an internal supervisory mechanism tasked with enforcing the code of ethics within the Assembly. Its primary responsibility is to evaluate the conduct of MPR members and to impose sanctions in cases of ethical violations, ranging from formal warnings to more stringent administrative measures such as temporary suspension of membership. By institutionalizing this function, the MK MPR is expected to uphold discipline, preserve the dignity of the legislature, and ensure that members consistently adhere to ethical standards in carrying out their constitutional duties.¹⁷

The MPR Honorary Court (MK MPR) will serve as an internal supervisory body responsible for examining and assessing whether members of the Assembly comply with the norms stipulated in the code of ethics. In cases of violation, the MK MPR has the authority to impose sanctions ranging from warnings to temporary suspension, or even dismissal from membership. The existence of the MK MPR is therefore crucial, as it functions as an institutional safeguard to uphold ethical standards within the legislature. With this body in place, members of the MPR are expected to be more closely monitored and consequently exercise greater caution and responsibility in their conduct, thereby reinforcing integrity and accountability in the legislative process.¹⁸

In addition to functioning as an internal supervisory mechanism, the MPR Honorary Court (MK MPR) can also serve as a platform for consolidating ethical norms and legislative standards of conduct in a more modern and progressive manner. In today's increasingly open democratic context, society holds high expectations of its representatives, particularly regarding transparency of information, accountability of actions, and adherence to public ethical values. Accordingly, the existence of the MK MPR would establish a new ethical framework that is not only repressive (punishing violations), but also preventive (detering misconduct) and educative (cultivating ethical awareness and conduct among legislators). This educative role is what distinguishes a modern ethical body from a conventional supervisory institution.

From a juridical perspective, the establishment of the MK MPR has strong legitimacy as it does not conflict with the Constitution and derives from the MPR's authority to regulate its own rules of procedure and code of ethics. This legitimacy can be

¹⁷ Syarifuddin and Kemas Gerby Novario, "Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan (MKD) Dan Penegakan Kode Etik DPR RI (DPR Honorary Council and The Enforcement of The Code of Ethics)," *Kajian* 22, no. 1 (2017): 1–14, <https://repository.unsri.ac.id/67156/1/5>. Artikel Kajian 2017.pdf.

¹⁸ Zamharira Nurdin et al., "Urgensi Kedudukan Majelis Kehormatan Mahkamah Konstitusi Ri Menurut UUD 1945," *Journal of Lex Philosophy (JLP)* 5, no. 2 (2024).

reinforced through amendments to existing MPR regulations or the adoption of new internal rules specifically governing the formation, structure, functions, and working mechanisms of the MK MPR. As a constitutional body empowered to amend the Constitution and inaugurate the President, the MPR must demonstrate institutional leadership by first ensuring that the moral integrity of its members is safeguarded through a robust ethical system.

In classical Islamic tradition, there existed the institution of *hisbah*, which was established to uphold good (*al-amr bi al-ma'ruf*) and prevent wrongdoing (*al-nahy 'an al-munkar*). A *muhtasib* was vested by the state with the authority to supervise the implementation of the sharī'ah, including overseeing the conduct of public officials. Imam al-Māwardī, in his seminal work *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, emphasized that *hisbah* constitutes a collective obligation (*farḍ kifāyah*) aimed at preserving social order and ensuring that public life remains aligned with ethical and religious norms.¹⁹

The concept of *hisbah* is highly relevant in the context of modern legislative ethics, as it reflects the need for an institutional mechanism that not only supervises but also educates and guides public officials to remain within the bounds of ethical conduct. Just as the *muhtasib* functioned as a guardian of public morality and accountability in classical Islamic governance, the establishment of the MK MPR can be viewed as a contemporary adaptation of this principle within Indonesia's constitutional framework. By drawing on the spirit of *hisbah*, the MK MPR is expected to serve as a guardian of integrity, ensuring that members of the Assembly embody values of honesty, responsibility, and justice, thereby strengthening both institutional credibility and public trust.

A comparative examination of parliamentary ethics oversight mechanisms in established democracies provides compelling evidence that institutionalized ethics bodies are not merely optional features of modern legislatures, but are integral components of democratic governance. Three examples are particularly instructive for the Indonesian context.

United Kingdom: Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards

In the United Kingdom, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (PCS) functions as an independent officer of the House of Commons, appointed for a fixed term and responsible for overseeing the operation of the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament. Upon receiving complaints from members of the public, other MPs, or on the Commissioner's own initiative the PCS conducts independent investigations and submits reports with findings and recommended sanctions to the Committee on Standards, a cross-party select committee. Crucially, the Commissioner operates with a high degree of independence from parliamentary factions: the position is held by a non-parliamentarian, ensuring that investigations are not subject to partisan interference. The UK model demonstrates the importance of combining institutional independence with procedural fairness: members are entitled to respond to allegations before a finding is

¹⁹ Imam Al Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam as-Sulthaniyyah: Hukum-Hukum Penyelenggaraan Negara Dalam Syariat Islam* (Jakarta Timur: Darul Falah, 2020).

made, and the Committee's deliberations are subject to publication. This transparency-accountability balance is highly relevant for the design of an MPR Honorary Court.²⁰

United States: House Committee on Ethics

In the United States, the House Committee on Ethics (formerly the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) exercises jurisdiction over the House Code of Official Conduct and holds authority to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations by members, officers, and employees of the House of Representatives. Composed of an equal number of members from both major political parties, the Committee is designed to be bipartisan in structure to minimize the risk of politically motivated decisions. The Committee may initiate investigations independently, issue formal written opinions (advisory opinions) to guide member conduct proactively, and impose sanctions ranging from reprimand and censure to expulsion the most severe sanction requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the full House. The US model is notable for its dual function: reactive (adjudicating alleged violations) and proactive (issuing guidance to prevent violations before they occur), a combination that reinforces both the deterrent and educative dimensions of ethical oversight. For the MPR, this dual function model could serve as a blueprint for an Honorary Court that does not merely punish but also guides.²¹

European Parliament: Code of Conduct and Advisory Committee

The European Parliament has developed a comprehensive Code of Conduct for its members, built around core values of integrity, transparency, openness, honesty, and accountability. Implementation is supported by the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members, composed of five former members of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which provides confidential guidance to members on questions of interpretation and examines alleged violations of the Code. Upon finding a violation, the President of the European Parliament may impose sanctions including reprimand and, in severe cases, temporary suspension of entitlements. The European Parliament model is particularly instructive in demonstrating that an ethics body composed of legally trained, independent external figures (rather than active politicians) can enhance both the credibility and impartiality of the enforcement process a design element worth considering in the institutional architecture of the MK MPR.²²

Comparative Synthesis: Implications for the MPR Honorary Court

These three comparative models converge on several design principles that are directly applicable to the proposed MPR Honorary Court. First, all three models ensure institutional independence from day-to-day political dynamics whether through a non-parliamentary commissioner, bipartisan committee composition, or external legal experts. Second, all three combine reactive enforcement with proactive guidance, ensuring that ethics supervision is both corrective and preventive. Third, all three operate through formalized, transparent procedures that guarantee due process for those accused of violations. Fourth, all three are anchored in explicit legal or regulatory frameworks,

²⁰ Philip Norton, *Parliament in British Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

²¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ethics, "Home - House Committee on Ethics," 2026.

²² European Parliament, *Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament with Respect to Financial Interests and Conflicts of Interest* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2022).

providing clear jurisdiction, authority, and sanctioning powers. The current absence of a permanent MPR ethics body stands in stark contrast to these international norms and reinforces the urgency of establishing a dedicated MK MPR that incorporates these established best practices.²³

A closer examination of the existing ethical oversight framework reveals that the institutional gap within the MPR cannot be resolved simply by relying on the ethical mechanisms of the DPR and DPD. While these bodies perform vital functions within their respective chambers, several structural reasons explain why they are insufficient to address ethical violations committed in the specific context of MPR duties.

First, the jurisdictional scope of the DPR's MKD and the DPD's BK is explicitly bounded by the institutional membership of their respective chambers. The DPR's MKD, established under DPR Regulation Number 1 of 2015, holds authority to examine, adjudicate, and sanction DPR members in their capacity as members of the DPR not as members of the MPR. Similarly, the DPD's Honorary Body exercises jurisdiction over DPD members acting within the institutional framework of the DPD. When DPR and DPD members convene as the MPR to exercise constitutional functions unique to that body, they operate under a different institutional identity. No clear legal provision currently assigns MKD or BK jurisdiction over ethical matters arising from this MPR-specific capacity.²⁴

Second, the risk of overlapping authority (*tumpang tindih kewenangan*) is a real and unresolved concern. In a scenario where an MPR member commits a code-of-ethics violation during a session of the MPR for example, during a constitutional amendment process it remains legally unclear which body holds jurisdiction: the MKD (if the member is from the DPR), the BK DPD (if from the DPD), or no body at all. This ambiguity creates a governance vacuum that could result in either dual jurisdiction (the same violation being addressed by two bodies with inconsistent outcomes) or complete non-enforcement (each body declining jurisdiction on the grounds that the conduct occurred outside its mandate). Neither outcome is acceptable for an institution entrusted with Indonesia's highest constitutional functions.²⁵

Third, the argument that existing ethics bodies are sufficient effectively treats the MPR as merely an extension of the DPR and DPD, rather than as a constitutionally distinct institution in its own right. While the post-amendment MPR is indeed composed of members from both chambers, the constitutional functions it exercises are *sui generis* unique to the MPR and exercisable by no other body. The establishment of a dedicated MPR Honorary Court would not duplicate or compete with MKD and DPD-BK, but would instead complement them by filling the jurisdictional gap that currently exists when

²³ Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), *Codes of Conduct for Members of Parliament: A Comparative Study* (Geneva: IPU, 2014), <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2016-01/codes-conduct-members-parliament>; .

²⁴ "Peraturan DPR RI Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 Tentang Kode Etik Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Pasal 1 Angka 4 Jo. Pasal 19–26." (n.d.).

²⁵ Kemas Ali Hanafiah, Syarifuddin, and Gerby Novario, "DPR Honorary Council and the Enforcement of the Code of Ethics," *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure* 17, no. 4 (2017): 423–436, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2017.V17.423-436>.

members act in their MPR capacity. A clear allocation of authority whereby the MK MPR handles violations committed in an MPR capacity, while MKD and BK retain jurisdiction over DPR and DPD capacity conduct respectively would eliminate overlap and ensure comprehensive, non-duplicative coverage of ethical enforcement across Indonesia's legislative framework.

A code of ethics in legislative institutions constitutes a set of moral and institutional norms governing the conduct of legislators in exercising their functions, authority, and responsibilities. Its primary purpose is to preserve institutional dignity, uphold moral integrity, and foster a clean and accountable political culture. Within legislative bodies such as the DPR, DPD, and MPR, the code of ethics serves as a principal standard for how representatives are expected to speak, behave, and act, both in formal institutional settings and in broader public life. In the constitutional system, ethical codes are commonly applied not only to representative institutions and government bodies, but also to various professions, in order to ensure that their members act with integrity, transparency, and responsibility in accordance with prevailing legal and moral norms.²⁶ In the legislative context, the scope of the code of ethics encompasses essential aspects such as personal integrity, institutional responsibility, relations with constituents, and proper conduct in official forums and public spaces. It generally includes prohibitions against corruption, collusion, and nepotism, restrictions on the abuse of office for personal or group interests, and obligations to maintain confidentiality, respect fellow members, uphold civility toward the public, and refrain from misusing state facilities or political authority for improper purposes.

In the context of legislative institutions, the code of ethics aims to safeguard integrity, credibility, and institutional honor as a representation of the people. Legislators are expected to carry out their duties by upholding justice, transparency, and accountability. Under Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (the MD3 Law), the code of ethics serves as a mandatory behavioral guideline for legislators in performing their functions, including maintaining harmonious relations with fellow members, other institutions, and society.²⁷

The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has adopted ethical rules through the Decree of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2/MPR/2010. This code contains provisions regulating the conduct, obligations, and prohibitions for MPR members in carrying out their parliamentary duties. Its purpose is to preserve the dignity, honor, image, and credibility of the MPR as a state institution. The decree explains that MPR members must uphold integrity, avoid conflicts of interest, and perform their duties responsibly and professionally in accordance with principles of public ethics.

With a code of ethics in place, legislators are expected to perform professionally and prioritize the public interest rather than narrow political interests. Violations may

²⁶ Darmawan Choirulsyah and Azhar Azhar, "Implementasi Etika Administrasi Publik : Langkah Utama Dalam Menciptakan Good Governance Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Pemerintahan Dan Politik* 9, no. 3 (2024): 195–203, <https://doi.org/10.36982/jpg.v9i3.3757>.

²⁷ Fitria Maharani Pratiwi, "Problematika Pergantianantar Waktu Anggota Legislatif Ditinjau dari Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 Tentang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah," no. July (2020).

result in moral sanctions, administrative penalties, or even proposals for dismissal from membership, depending on the severity of the misconduct and the applicable internal mechanism.

In Indonesia's parliamentary system, enforcement bodies differ depending on institutional structure. In the DPR, the Honorary Council of the House (Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan/MKD), established under DPR Regulation Number 1 of 2015, has authority to examine, adjudicate, and impose sanctions on DPR members suspected of ethical violations. The process includes public complaints, internal verification, ethics hearings, and the reading of decisions, which may range from reprimands and warnings to recommendations for dismissal. Meanwhile, the DPD has an Honorary Body (Badan Kehormatan/BK DPD) with a similar role in enforcing ethics and discipline among DPD members. Both bodies represent concrete institutionalization of ethical values within Indonesia's legislative environment.

A code of ethics functions as a guideline regulating actions and behavior in carrying out duties and responsibilities. It sets clear boundaries on what is permitted and prohibited, ensuring that members of an institution or profession act in line with prevailing moral values and norms.²⁸ A code of ethics seeks to uphold the integrity and honor of both individuals and the institutions in which they serve. In representative bodies, for instance, ethical enforcement ensures that legislators act professionally, honestly, and responsibly, thereby increasing public trust. Ethical compliance also enhances accountability, as individuals are morally and legally responsible for their actions.

From the perspective of *siyāsah shar'iyah* (Islamic political governance), a code of ethics represents the moral and spiritual values that must be upheld by all holders of authority. Ethics is not merely an administrative rule, but an expression of personal and institutional integrity rooted in justice, trustworthiness (*amānah*), responsibility, and transparency. In Islam, power is a trust for which accountability is demanded, as stated by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him): "Each of you is a shepherd and each of you will be questioned about your flock" (Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim). Therefore, violations of a code of ethics are not only breaches of internal rules, but also a betrayal of public trust that Islamic law treats as a serious matter.

The Qur'an affirms the importance of ethical governance, as stated in Surah An-Nisā' verse 58: "Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice." This verse provides a normative foundation that justice and fulfillment of trust are two primary pillars of governance. In addition, Surah Ash-Shu'arā' verse 183 warns against depriving others of their rights and spreading *فساد* (corruption) on earth, serving as a moral principle against abuse of power. Thus, within institutions such as the MPR, ethical enforcement must be understood as part of a moral and religious commitment to realizing a just, trustworthy, and dignified government. Institutionalizing ethics through the establishment of an Honorary Court

²⁸ Heriyono Tardjono, "Urgensi Etika Profesi Hukum Sebagai Upaya Penegakan Hukum Yang Berkeadilan Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Kepastian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 2, no. 2 (2021): 51, <https://doi.org/10.32502/khdk.v2i2.3462>.

becomes essential to ensure that Islamic governance principles are not merely discourse, but are concretely embodied in the structure and practice of state institutions.

Institutional integrity constitutes a fundamental element in the administration of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, particularly within representative institutions entrusted with constitutional authority. In the context of state institutions, integrity is not limited to the personal conduct of public officials, but also reflects the institutional quality of an organization in exercising its functions and powers responsibly. It represents a collective commitment to uphold values such as honesty, justice, transparency, accountability, and compliance with the Constitution and statutory regulations. Without such integrity, representative institutions become vulnerable to corrupt practices, abuse of power, and declining public trust, conditions that may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional system itself.

Within Indonesia's constitutional system, institutional integrity has become increasingly important along with growing public demands for clean governance that is free from conflicts of interest.²⁹ The public no longer assesses the performance of state institutions merely by policy outputs or work programs, but also by ethical attitudes, moral consistency, and the alignment between the words and actions of public officials who represent these institutions.³⁰ Therefore, every state institution especially legislative bodies such as the MPR must have a strong internal system to ensure that integrity is not merely a slogan, but is genuinely manifested in institutional behavior and decision-making.

The People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR), as a high state institution composed of members of the DPR and DPD, holds a strategic role in safeguarding the dignity and ethics of national and state life. This is reflected in MPR Decree Number VI/MPR/2001 on the Ethics of National Life, which explicitly affirms the importance of moral and ethical values in state practice. However, to date, the MPR has not established an internal ethics body comparable to the House of Representatives' Honorary Court (Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan/MKD) in the DPR or the Honorary Body (Badan Kehormatan) in the DPD, both of which are specifically tasked with enforcing discipline and codes of ethics among their members. This situation creates a significant gap within the MPR's institutional integrity system, due to the absence of an independent and professional oversight mechanism for members' conduct while carrying out constitutional duties in the name of the MPR.

The integrity of state institutions cannot be separated from the strengthening of good governance values such as accountability, transparency, participation, and the supremacy of law. The establishment of an ethics institution such as an MPR Honorary Court is part of a broader institutional reform effort to ensure that state institutions are

²⁹ Ridwan Syaidi Tarigan, *Reformasi Hukum Tata Negara: Menuju Keadilan Dan Keseimbangan* (Ruang Berkarya, 2024).

³⁰ Tegar Prayoga Purwantoro, Muhammad Masyeh Guruh Tuanaya, and Yehuda Natanael Thesti, "Mendorong Pembentukan Undang-Undang Etika Penyelenggara Negara Sebagai Instrumen Konstitusional Dalam Mengatasi Krisis Kepercayaan Publik," *Jurnal Kewarganegaraan* 9, no. 1 (2025): 64–75.

not only structurally strong but also morally and ethically resilient.³¹ In this framework, integrity becomes the heart of a healthy democracy, because it determines the extent to which state institutions can perform their functions responsibly, fairly, and in a manner oriented toward the public interest.

Dalam konteks ketatanegaraan Indonesia yang semakin dinamis, In the increasingly dynamic Indonesian constitutional context, discussion of state institutional integrity cannot be separated from the transformation of values and governance toward clean, transparent administration oriented to public service.³² Institutional integrity concerns not only the behavior of individuals within the institution, but also reflects the quality of the systems, procedures, and institutional structures that support the execution of its constitutional duties and functions. Therefore, integrity must be understood as an institutional construct realized through synergy between ethical values, legal compliance, and effective internal oversight mechanisms.

One important dimension of institutional integrity is commitment to institutional ethics, which includes principles of honesty, justice, accountability, and social responsibility.³³ In practice, an institution with high integrity is one that treats these values as guidelines in every policy-making process, program implementation, and interaction with the public. Commitment to institutional ethics prevents institutions from corrupt, manipulative acts, or abuses of authority that often lead to declining public trust in government.

From the perspective of *siyāṣah shar'īyyah*, integrity (*amānah*, steadfastness/consistency (*istiqāmah*), and justice) is an absolute requirement for holders of power and public officials.³⁴ In Islam, integrity is not only about compliance with law, but also moral obedience to the values of the Sharī'ah. Leaders and representatives with integrity are those whose words and actions are consistent, and whose commitments prioritize the welfare of the ummah. The Qur'an repeatedly emphasizes the importance of trustworthiness (*amānah*) in leadership. Allah the Exalted says: "Indeed, the best one you can hire is the one who is strong and trustworthy (*amīn*)."³⁵ This verse speaks not only about competence, but also about honesty and the moral responsibility of an official.

Moreover, in Surah At-Tahrim verse 6, Allah commands leaders to protect themselves and their families from the Fire interpreted by scholars as a warning for leaders to uphold their trust properly. In another hadith, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: "No servant whom Allah appoints to lead people, and he does not care for and manage them well, except that he will not smell the fragrance of Paradise."

³¹ Luluk Imro'atus Sholikah, Nabela Setyawati, and Lutfi Firahayu, "Reformasi Marwah MK Melalui Pengembalian Pengawas Eksternal Hakim Konstitusi," *Sosio Yustisia Jurnal Hukum Dan Perubahan Sosial* 3, no. 2 (November 2023): 242–79, <https://doi.org/10.15642/sosyus.v3i2.522>.

³² Fanila Kasmita Kusuma, "Birokrasi Berintegritas: Fondasi Menuju Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Bersih," *Media Bina Ilmiah* 18, no. 6 (2024): 1527–36.

³³ Nur Ahmad Al Fai'q et al., "Analisis Akuntabilitas Dan Transparansi Dalam Etika Politik Islam," *Sosial Simbiosis: Jurnal Integrasi Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik* 1, no. 3 (June 2024): 64–77, <https://doi.org/10.62383/sosial.v1i3.403>.

³⁴ Imam Al-Mawardi, *Ahkam Sulthaniyah: Sistem Pemerintahan Khilafah Islam* (Jakarta: Qisthi Press, 2016).

This indicates that integrity is not merely a worldly demand, but also has consequences for accountability in the Hereafter.

In the context of a legislative institution such as the MPR, the integrity of its members greatly influences the quality of its decisions and public trust. The establishment of an MPR Honorary Court (MK MPR) is not only intended to enforce the code of ethics administratively, but also as an effort to safeguard the *maqāṣid al-shaī'ah* namely, preserving public morality, preventing abuse of power, and shaping a clean and accountable governmental order.

3.2. The Urgency of Establishing an MPR Honorary Court in Comparative and Institutional Perspective

The urgency of establishing the Honorary Court of the People's Consultative Assembly (Mahkamah Kehormatan MPR/MK MPR) in the context of enforcing a code of ethics and strengthening the integrity of Indonesia's legislative institutions should not be underestimated. As a high state institution, the MPR plays a vital role in Indonesia's constitutional system, including amending and enacting the Constitution as well as selecting the President and Vice President in the event of a vacancy in office.³⁵

These strategic decisions must be made with careful ethical and moral consideration in order to avoid conflicts of interest that could undermine the legitimacy of state institutions. Therefore, the existence of an MPR Honorary Court is considered essential to ensure that every MPR member consistently acts in accordance with the established code of ethics, preserves both personal and institutional integrity, and avoids practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism.³⁶

The establishment of the MK MPR is expected to provide effective oversight of MPR members in carrying out their duties and authorities. The code of ethics that serves as the basis for this oversight is not merely intended to prohibit misconduct, but also to encourage each MPR member to consistently behave in accordance with the norms applicable within society and the constitutional order. This is where the role of the MPR Honorary Court becomes highly strategic, because the MK MPR is tasked with ensuring that violations of the code of ethics can be addressed through clear procedures and proportionate sanctions. This oversight process also sends a signal to the public that the MPR is serious about safeguarding the honor and integrity of its institution. Without such a mechanism, the integrity of the MPR as a representative institution of the people may be threatened, and public trust in the legislature will decline.³⁷

In addition to preserving the integrity and credibility of the legislature, establishing an MPR Honorary Court is also important for strengthening democratic principles in Indonesia. In a healthy democratic system, every state institution must be subject to

³⁵ Titik Triwulan Tutik, "Kedudukan Konstitusional Menteri Triumvirat Sebagai Pelaksana Tugas Kepresidenan Dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial Di Indonesia," *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Perundangan Islam* 10, no. 2 (October 2020): 275–302, <https://doi.org/10.15642/ad.2020.10.2.275-302>.

³⁶ Muzayyin Mahbub, "Dialektika Pembaruan Sistem Hukum Indonesia," 2012, 370.

³⁷ Mohammad Rifqi Aziz, "Peran Dan Implementasi Dpr Sebagai Bentuk Checks and Balances Terhadap Kebijakan Kepala Otorita Ikn," *Jurnal Konstitusi Dan Demokrasi* 3, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkd.v3i2.1308>.

effective oversight, including legislative bodies that play a major role in political decision-making. The MPR Honorary Court is not only an internal body supervising the conduct of MPR members, but also an instrument to improve the image of the legislature in the eyes of the public by increasing transparency and accountability.

The importance of establishing an MPR Honorary Court is also evident in the broader effort to strengthen democracy and the system of checks and balances in Indonesia. Therefore, the urgency of creating the MK MPR is clear, because it provides assurance that MPR members can act responsibly and in accordance with established ethical principles, thereby preserving the honor and dignity of the MPR as a state institution.³⁸

The urgency of this institution also highlights the importance of safeguarding the maqāsid al-sharī'ah, particularly ḥifẓ al-dīn (protection of religion), ḥifẓ al-'ird (protection of honor), and ḥifẓ al-māl (protection of wealth), which are often threatened by corruption, abuse of office, or other unethical conduct by public officials. With an Honorary Court functioning effectively, the principles of Sharī'ah in governance are not merely normative doctrines, but are implemented concretely within the constitutional system, including through oversight of MPR members.

The establishment of the MPR Honorary Court (Mahkamah Kehormatan MPR/MK MPR) has become an important topic in studies of ethics and governance within legislative institutions. In the minutes of the MPR Joint Meeting on 23 September 2024, the formation of this body was discussed in depth. Various factions and DPD groups presented diverse views, ranging from its urgency and enforcement mechanisms to whether the institution should be permanent or ad hoc. According to Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Vice Chair of the MPR, the MPR Honorary Court is needed to: (1) safeguard the integrity and authority of the MPR as a high state institution; (2) address violations of the code of ethics independently and firmly; and (3) uphold the dignity and credibility of MPR members in carrying out their duties.³⁹

This position was further reinforced by a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) held by the drafting team, which invited legal experts such as Prof. Jimly Asshiddiqie and Prof. Fitra Arsil. They also supported the establishment of this institution as a moral control mechanism for MPR members.⁴⁰ Based on the discussion results, the urgency of establishing the MK MPR of the Republic of Indonesia is grounded in several factors: (1) limited ethical oversight within the MPR unlike the DPR and DPD, which already have dedicated ethics bodies, the MPR still relies on an ad hoc Ethics Team, resulting in weak enforcement mechanisms for MPR members; (2) increasing ethical violations by state officials the speakers emphasized that various ethical breaches occurring within legislative institutions must be addressed seriously, and without a clear institution, monitoring the conduct of MPR members becomes difficult; and (3) the importance of

³⁸ M Reza Saputra, "Analisis Potensi Implementasi Sistem Politik Tanpa Partai Di Indonesia Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Demokrasi Dan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan," 2024.

³⁹ Pernyataan Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, dalam Rapat Gabungan MPR pada tanggal 23 September 2024

⁴⁰ Nuri Evirayanti, "Pelaksanaan Tugas Dan Wewenang Badan Kehormatan Sebagai Alat Kelengkapan DPRD Dalam Menjaga Martabat Dan Kehormatan Anggota DPRD Berdasarkan Kode Etik DPRD (Studi Pada DPRD Provinsi Jambi)," *Diss. Program Pascasarjana Universitas Diponegoro*, 2009.

the MPR as a national ethical role model as an institution responsible for the Constitution and MPR decrees (TAP MPR), the MPR should be a pioneer in implementing national ethics in public and state life.

The discussion also noted that other institutions such as the DPR, DPD, the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK), and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) already have their own ethics bodies. This indicates that the institutionalization of ethics within the MPR is not a new concept in Indonesia's constitutional system, but rather an urgent necessity. The establishment of the MK MPR is expected to produce positive impacts on legislative governance, including: (1) increasing public trust in the MPR as a state institution that upholds ethical values; (2) preventing and reducing ethical violations so that MPR members become more accountable in performing their duties; and (3) strengthening the role of the MPR within the democratic system by serving as an example for other state institutions in enforcing national ethical standards.

Accordingly, it can be concluded that the institutionalization of national ethics through the establishment of an MPR Honorary Court is a crucial step in strengthening the ethical system within legislative institutions. With a stronger oversight mechanism, the MPR is expected to serve as a model in maintaining political ethics and to contribute to improving the quality of democracy in Indonesia.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the meeting minutes show that various factions and DPD groups expressed differing views on the urgency and form of the MK MPR: (1) the PKB and PKS factions stated that the MK MPR should be permanent to enhance credibility and ensure it does not merely become a political instrument; and (2) the Golkar, Demokrat, and NasDem factions were more supportive of an ad hoc MK MPR, established only when a case of a code-of-ethics violation arises.

From the discussion results, although differences of opinion remain, the majority of members agreed that the MPR needs a stronger ethical mechanism, whether in the form of a permanent body or an ad hoc one.⁴² In this study, the author conducted in-depth interviews with several MPR members, MPR staff, and members of the MPR Honorary Court to obtain a clearer picture of the urgency of establishing the Honorary Court of the People's Consultative Assembly (MK MPR) in order to enforce the code of ethics and strengthen the integrity of the legislative institution.⁴³

Agip Munandar, an MPR staff member who is also part of the Drafting Team, explained: "In general, oversight of MPR members is more partial in nature and often ad hoc. Over time, this was regulated through MPR Decision Number 2 of 2010 concerning the Code of Ethics, and even that was casuistic in nature. Only when there is a violation or a complaint against an MPR member is it followed up through the establishment of an MPR Honorary Court. However, since that decision was enacted, there has never been any enforcement of the code of ethics." He continued: "Given the dynamics that have

⁴¹ M.S. Prof. Dr. H. Asep Kartiwa, Drs., S.H., *Sistem Politik Indonesia*, ed. M.Si Drs. Beni Ahmad Saebani (CV. Pustaka Setia Bandung, 2013).

⁴² M.A. Dr. H. M. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Risalah Focus Group Discussion Pimpinan MPR" (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2024).

⁴³ "Pro Kontra Penegakan Etik Secara Internal Dan Eksternal," *Jurnal Konstitusi Dan Demokrasi* 1, no. 1 (June 2021), <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkd.v1i1.1104>.

occurred, it is felt that the MPR needs a Code of Ethics, especially because previously the MPR issued an MPR Decree (TAP MPR) on the Ethics of National Life.” This indicates that although the MPR already has a code of ethics, enforcement of violations has not functioned optimally.

Ibnu added: “The institutionalization process must reflect the three basic values of law: utility, certainty, and justice. As Mr. Agip said, at present it is only casuistic. So, when there is a case/complaint against an MPR member, only then is a working team formed by the MPR leadership as an auxiliary body of the leadership not as a permanent organ of the MPR that stands independently (separately).” He continued: “Departing from that, we have MPR Decree (TAP MPR) Number VI of 2001 on the Ethics of National Life as a reference for all entities administering the state in Indonesia executive, legislative, and judicial. Although there is opposition because it is considered that there are already institutions handling code-of-ethics issues in the DPR and DPD,⁴⁴ from the standpoint of institutional needs it is required so that the MPR can carry out its duties and authorities better.” From these interviews, it is evident that the existing Honorary Body/Court is ad hoc (non-permanent).

Observations of the implementation of the code of ethics within the MPR also reveal shortcomings in members’ understanding and in oversight of legislative conduct. Bayu stated: “Most MPR members often do not realize the importance of the code of ethics or view it as guidance that is not particularly urgent to follow. In fact, in carrying out their function as representatives of the people, the code of ethics is crucial to maintaining the image and integrity of the institution.” This suggests that education regarding the code of ethics and the importance of its implementation is still insufficiently emphasized among legislators.

In Agip Munandar’s view, the establishment of an Honorary Court must be based on a clear mechanism and must not overlap with the DPR’s Honorary Court and the DPD’s Honorary Body. Therefore, it must be ensured that the MK MPR does not merely replicate existing mechanisms, but instead has independence and clearly defined authority. Based on the discussions, the MK MPR is proposed to have a maximum of 15 members, consisting proportionally of representatives from parliamentary factions and DPD groups. Meanwhile, sanctions must be imposed based on the code of ethics already established in MPR regulations.

The urgency of establishing an Honorary Court within the MPR becomes even more apparent when viewed from the perspective of institutional governance dynamics in the reform era, which increasingly emphasizes the principles of good governance, public accountability, and the integrity of state officials. In this regard, the MPR as a high state institution with constitutional legitimacy through the representation of the DPR and DPD bears a major responsibility in embedding ethical values within the constitutional system. Therefore, the presence of an Honorary Court is not merely an administrative necessity, but part of the institutionalization of social and legal norms aimed at fostering a clean and dignified political culture.

⁴⁴ “Ketetapan MPR RI No. VI Tentang Etika Kehidupan Berbangsa,” 2001.

Conceptually, the urgency of the MPR Honorary Court must be seen within a broader institutional framework, namely as a formal mechanism for enforcing ethical values and political integrity in parliament. In many modern democracies, parliamentary ethics bodies are an inseparable part of the checks-and-balances system, where the legislature not only supervises the executive, but is also supervised internally through mechanisms that regulate and safeguard members' conduct. Without such a mechanism, the legislature risks becoming an uncontrolled institution, vulnerable to conflicts of interest, and distant from public oversight. In this context, the MPR Honorary Court is expected to function as an instrument to correct and prevent ethical deviations by representatives of the people especially when carrying out MPR-specific functions such as amending the Constitution, inaugurating the President and Vice President, and issuing strategic state decrees.

Another key concern is public legitimacy: public perceptions of state-institution integrity directly affect the overall stability and credibility of democracy.⁴⁵ Surveys by independent organizations such as LSI, Indikator Politik, and Transparency International Indonesia indicate declining public trust in legislative institutions due to recurring moral and ethical scandals involving parliamentarians, including MPR members. Without a dedicated body to handle such violations seriously, a moral hazard emerges because deterrence is weak. Establishing an MPR Honorary Court would therefore signal a firm commitment to ethical enforcement and help restore eroding public trust.

The urgency also lies in strengthening the MPR's institutional capacity to respond to contemporary challenges. In an era of digital transformation and open information, legislators' actions are continuously scrutinized, and ethical misconduct is increasingly difficult to conceal. This context requires an institution that is responsive, professional, and empowered to follow up public complaints through transparent and fair procedures. The MPR Honorary Court could also serve as a bridge between citizens and the legislature through an open, accountable, evidence-based complaint mechanism.

Another rationale is to support the realization of Pancasila values and constitutional norms in state practice. As mandated by MPR Decree No. VI/MPR/2001 on the Ethics of National Life, state officials must uphold honesty, responsibility, and justice. The MPR Honorary Court could function as a constitutional instrument to institutionalize these ethical standards, positioning the MPR not only as a maker of strategic state decisions but also as a national role model of political ethics. This is crucial because ethical crises within the legislature often expand into broader crises of trust in democracy and the rule of law.

Institutionally, the Honorary Court is needed to address fragmented and uncoordinated ethical mechanisms between the DPR and DPD. Since the MPR is a collective body composed of members from both institutions, ethical enforcement cannot rely solely on each chamber's ethics body. The MPR Honorary Court is necessary to handle violations committed when members act specifically in their MPR capacity.

⁴⁵ Yandi et al., "Dinamika Hukum Dan Korupsi Politik (Dampak Dan Tantangan Penegakan Hukum Di Indonesia)," *Unizar Law Review* 7, no. 1 (June 2024): 35–48, <https://doi.org/10.36679/ulr.v7i1.64>.

The institution is also important for building a self-correcting mechanism within the legislature. Modern institutional theory emphasizes that public institutions should be able to evaluate and correct internal conduct independently. An MPR Honorary Court could conduct periodic ethics audits, monitor compliance, and recommend revisions to policies or the code of ethics when weaknesses are identified making it not only reactive, but also proactive in preventing misconduct.

From a human rights perspective and the principle of due process of law, the Honorary Court can provide a fair and legitimate forum for MPR members accused of ethical violations. Without such a body, accused members lack an official forum to defend themselves openly and systematically. Formal ethics procedures also ensure decisions are grounded in legal reasoning rather than public opinion or political pressure, balancing the public's right to information with legislators' right to a fair process.

From the perspective of *fiqh siyasah*, establishing an Honorary Court aligns with *al-siyāṣah al-shar'īyyah* governance grounded in Islamic moral-legal values. In this framework, the state must uphold justice, prevent wrongdoing, and ensure officeholders fulfill their trust (*amānah*). An Honorary Court functions as a guardian of these values by supervising and sanctioning ethical violations to prevent abuses of power that undermine public trust. This corresponds to the Islamic principle of *ḥisbah*, a form of social and institutional oversight aimed at preserving public welfare and preventing moral harm. Thus, the MPR Honorary Court is not merely administrative, but also an institutional embodiment of Islamic governance principles for a just, clean, and accountable government.

Finally, the urgency of establishing the MPR Honorary Court is closely linked to broader legislative institutional reform. Strengthening substantive democracy requires not only procedural improvements in elections and legislation, but also reforms in the mindset and integrity of public officeholders. The Honorary Court can support a more meritocratic political environment by elevating ethical and integrity-based standards in decision-making. If it functions effectively, the MPR will gain greater respect as a high state institution and could become a national center of legislative ethics and a model for other institutions.

The urgency of establishing an MPR Honorary Court is further reinforced by its legal implications for strengthening accountability and professionalism within the legislative sphere. A permanent ethics body within the MPR would provide a clearer and more authoritative legal mechanism for enforcing the code of ethics, so that allegations of ethical misconduct could be examined and resolved in a transparent, objective, and institutionalized manner. In the absence of such a body, ethical oversight in the MPR tends to remain ad hoc and reliant upon internal political considerations, which may lead to inconsistency in sanctioning members who breach ethical standards. Therefore, the establishment of an MPR Honorary Court, supported by a definite legal basis, would not only enhance legal certainty in ethical enforcement but also minimize political intervention that could undermine the integrity of the institution.

From a constitutional and legal perspective, establishing the MPR Honorary Court would also have meaningful implications for Indonesia's constitutional system. With such

a body in place, legal processes concerning MPR members who violate the code of ethics would become more structured and accountable. So far, enforcement of ethical rules against legislators has often been unclear or inconsistent, potentially undermining the credibility of legislative institutions as a whole. The MPR Honorary Court would ensure that each ethical breach receives proper attention, through objective examination and the imposition of appropriate sanctions. These sanctions may range from oral or written reprimands to temporary suspension or removal from MPR membership, depending on the seriousness of the violation. Another legal implication is greater legal certainty for the public regarding the moral and ethical responsibilities that MPR members must uphold. The examination process conducted by the MPR Honorary Court would be more transparent, open, and conducted in accordance with procedures consistent with applicable legal principles. This would promote a sense of justice and legal certainty both for MPR members and for the public overseeing their performance.⁴⁶

With a clear mechanism in the MPR Honorary Court, the public can see that legislators are genuinely accountable and subject to enforceable rules strengthening political legitimacy and ensuring MPR decisions rest on solid moral and legal foundations. It also protects professional MPR members from baseless ethical accusations or partisan interference by providing a formal, fair forum for assessment.⁴⁷

Overall, a permanent MPR Honorary Court would enhance Indonesia's democratic governance by boosting public trust, deterring abuse of power, and reinforcing institutional integrity through both preventive ethics education and consistent enforcement. It would convert the existing Code of Ethics (MPR Decision No. 2/MPR/2010) from a largely administrative norm into a structured quasi-legal process investigation, evidence, and reasoned decisions that can develop consistent ethics "jurisprudence" and integrated legislative ethical codification.

Establishing an MPR Honorary Court would strengthen the MPR's legitimacy as a modern state institution that is adaptive to developments in constitutional law. In an era when democracy increasingly demands accountability, the public needs assurance that every state institution has an internal system to control, evaluate, and correct the conduct of its members. In this sense, the Honorary Court is not merely an internal disciplinary tool, but also a symbol of institutional reform signaling the MPR's commitment to upholding the "rule of ethics" alongside the rule of law.⁴⁸ When this commitment is embodied in a formal institution that works objectively and transparently, public confidence in the MPR as a representative body can grow significantly. Moreover, by setting clear ethical benchmarks, the Court can encourage higher professionalism: members become more cautious and responsible in deliberations, public statements, and

⁴⁶ Aziz, "Peran Dan Implementasi Dpr Sebagai Bentuk Checks and Balances Terhadap Kebijakan Kepala Otorita Ikn."

⁴⁷ Dr. H. M. Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Risalah Focus Group Discussion Pimpinan MPR."

⁴⁸ Pramesti Ratu Fiqih, Adellia Mahardhika Widodo, and Anisa Miftahul Firdaus, "Analisis Penerapan Rule Of Law Oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai The Guardian Of Constitution (Studi Kasus Putusan MK Nomor 90/PUU-XXI/2023)," *DISCOURSE: Indonesian Journal of Social Studies and Education* 1, no. 3 (July 2024): 238–49, <https://doi.org/10.69875/djosse.v1i3.126>.

interactions with constituents, so that professionalism is measured not only by legislative capacity but also by moral exemplarity.

Equally important, an MPR Honorary Court can provide legal protection for members who are defamed or accused of ethical violations without adequate basis.⁴⁹ It can serve as an objective forum for clarification and defense, where allegations are tested through evidence and due process, thereby preventing “trial by the press” and disproportionate public pressure that is sometimes used as a political weapon. At the national level, the Court may also synergize with institutions such as the KPK, Komnas HAM, and the Ombudsman to develop broader ethical standards that cover not only minor misconduct but also patterns that may lead to serious legal violations, such as corruption, nepotism, or abuse of power. Functionally, it can become the first line of detection identifying early warning signs and coordinating follow-up with law enforcement when needed so that enforcement becomes more integrated and preventive. Beyond institutional governance, a strong ethics mechanism also contributes to legal education and public legal culture: it reinforces the idea that in a modern rule-of-law state, law does not stop at formal legality, but extends to moral and ethical accountability as part of building a dignified, sustainable democracy.

From the perspective of *fiqh siyasah*,⁵⁰ establishing an Honorary Court within the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) represents an institutionalization of the principles of *hisbah* and *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar* within a modern constitutional structure. *Fiqh siyasah* teaches that rulers and public officials are obliged to uphold the trust (*amanah*) with full integrity and must be subject to oversight so that they do not deviate from the principles of justice and the welfare of the community (*maslahah al-ummah*).

One doctrinal foundation in *fiqh siyasah* that reinforces the importance of ethical oversight for leaders and public officials is Allah’s statement in Qur’an Surah An-Nisā’ (4:58): “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due, and when you judge between people, to judge with justice...” This verse affirms the principles of accountability and justice in the exercise of authority. In the context of the MPR as an institution entrusted with the people’s mandate, every member is required to uphold justice and avoid abusing office. The establishment of an Honorary Court is a concrete institutional step to realize this principle in practice.

In addition, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: “Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you will be questioned about those under your care.” (Narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim). This hadith underscores that public officials are accountable before Allah and society one of the core principles of leadership in Islam. Therefore, creating a structural institution tasked with safeguarding the morality, ethics, and integrity of public officials such as an Honorary Court accords strongly with the values embedded in *fiqh siyasah*.

Furthermore, the principle of oversight and ethical enforcement within state institutions is also consistent with the function of *wilāyat al-mazālim* in classical Islamic governance: a special body established to adjudicate wrongdoing and abuse of authority

⁴⁹ Hanafiah, Syarifuddin, and Novario, “DPR Honorary Council and the Enforcement of the Code of Ethics.”

⁵⁰ Al-Mawardi, *Ahkam Sulthaniyah: Sistem Pemerintahan Khilafah Islam*.

by rulers and high-ranking officials. Substantively, this concept resembles ethics institutions in modern democracies that aim to prevent and adjudicate misconduct and ethical violations in office. From the viewpoint of fiqh siyasah, the establishment of an MPR Honorary Court is not only legally valid within state law, but also rests on a strong Sharī'ah foundation as an instrument for enforcing trust, justice, and ethical leadership within the legislative sphere.

The urgency of establishing an MPR Honorary Court must also be understood in light of the juridical and institutional challenges surrounding its formation. Based on interviews with informants within the MPR, the proposal continues to face significant hurdles in terms of political agreement, institutional structure, budgeting, and supporting facilities. From a political perspective, factions have not yet reached a common position on whether such a body should be established as a permanent organ, and internal dynamics often shape the decision-making process because institutional policies must reflect the agreement of all elements within the MPR, including the DPR and DPD. At the institutional level, the current ethics mechanism remains ad hoc rather than permanent, creating uncertainty regarding its legal standing and operational procedures. Budgetary issues also pose a challenge, as the absence of a clear legal basis makes it difficult to ensure stable allocation within the MPR's institutional budget, while supporting infrastructure remains limited when compared to established ethics bodies such as the DPR's Honorary Council.

Normatively, the most fundamental challenge is the lack of an explicit statutory foundation defining the Honorary Court's position and authority, unlike the MKD which is anchored in the MD3 Law.⁵¹ This weak legal footing limits enforceability and executory power in imposing sanctions. Additional complexity stems from the MPR's dual membership (DPR and DPD), raising jurisdictional questions: whether the MPR Honorary Court can examine and sanction members who remain institutionally subject to the DPR's MKD or the DPD's Honorary Body. Without a clear allocation of authority, overlap and dualism in ethics oversight may occur, potentially leading to responsibility-shifting and unresolved violations. Independence is another concern, since internal ethics bodies are vulnerable to partisan intervention if dominated by political actors, and the absence of standardized quasi-judicial procedures (investigation, proof, sanctions, appeals) risks challenges to legitimacy.

To ensure effectiveness, three core solutions are required: first, a strong legal umbrella ideally through amendment of the MD3 Law or a specific law clearly regulating status, authority, procedures, and decision-making. Second, an integrated ethical oversight framework that divides jurisdiction: the MPR Honorary Court handles violations committed in an MPR capacity, while MKD/BK retain authority for DPR/DPD-capacity violations, alongside harmonized ethical standards. Third, an institutional design that guarantees independence through balanced membership (including credible external elements), supported by clear SOPs for complaint handling and transparent hearings,

⁵¹ Rizki Ramadani, "Lembaga Negara Independen Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Konsep Independent Regulatory Agencies," *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 27, no. 1 (January 2020), <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol27.iss1.art9>.

adequate budget and facilities, and periodic performance evaluation using KPIs (case handling, complainant satisfaction, and recurrence of violations).

4. CONCLUSION

The establishment of the MPR Honorary Court (Mahkamah Kehormatan MPR/MK MPR) constitutes an urgent and legally grounded necessity to address the institutional gap in ethical oversight within Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly, an institution entrusted with the highest-order constitutional functions including constitutional amendment and presidential inauguration. This study finds that the current reliance on ad hoc mechanisms and the ethical bodies of the DPR (MKD) and DPD (BK) is structurally insufficient, as neither body holds clear jurisdiction over ethical violations committed by members acting in their distinct capacity as MPR members creating a governance vacuum that weakens accountability within Indonesia's post-amendment constitutional architecture. From a comparative perspective, established democracies including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union consistently demonstrate that permanent, independent ethics bodies with clearly defined jurisdiction, formalized procedures, and both reactive and proactive mandates are indispensable features of credible legislative governance. From the perspective of *fiqh siyasah*, the proposed MK MPR reflects the institutionalization of the *hisbah* principle within a modern constitutional framework, embodying the Islamic governance values of *amanah* (trustworthiness), justice, and the prevention of wrongdoing (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) in the legislative sphere, as affirmed in Surah An-Nisa' (4:58) and the prophetic tradition on accountability in leadership.

REFERENCE

- (IPU), Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Codes of Conduct for Members of Parliament: A Comparative Study*. Geneva: IPU, 2014. <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2016-01/codes-conduct-members-parliament>; .
- Al-Mawardi, Imam. *Ahkam Sulthaniyah: Sistem Pemerintahan Khilafah Islam*. Jakarta: Qisthi Press, 2016.
- Asshiddiqie, Jimly. *Konstitusi Dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia*. Edisi Revi. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2011.
- Aziz, Mohammad Rifqi. "Peran Dan Implementasi Dpr Sebagai Bentuk Checks and Balances Terhadap Kebijakan Kepala Otorita Ikn." *Jurnal Konstitusi Dan Demokrasi* 3, no. 2 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkd.v3i2.1308>.
- Choirulsyah, Darmawan, and Azhar Azhar. "Implementasi Etika Administrasi Publik: Langkah Utama Dalam Menciptakan Good Governance Di Indonesia." *Jurnal Pemerintahan Dan Politik* 9, no. 3 (2024): 195–203. <https://doi.org/10.36982/jpg.v9i3.3757>.
- Dr. H. M. Hidayat Nur Wahid, M.A. "Risalah Focus Group Discussion Pimpinan MPR." Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2024.
- Evirayanti, Nuri. "Pelaksanaan Tugas Dan Wewenang Badan Kehormatan Sebagai Alat

Kelengkapan DPRD Dalam Menjaga Martabat Dan Kehormatan Anggota DPRD Berdasarkan Kode Etik DPRD (Studi Pada DPRD Provinsi Jambi)." *Diss. Program Pascasarjana Universitas Diponegoro*, 2009.

- Fiqih, Pramesti Ratu, Adellia Mahardhika Widodo, and Anisa Miftahul Firdaus. "Analisis Penerapan Rule Of Law Oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai The Guardian Of Constitution (Studi Kasus Putusan MK Nomor 90/PUU-XXI/2023)." *DISCOURSE: Indonesian Journal of Social Studies and Education* 1, no. 3 (July 2024): 238–49. <https://doi.org/10.69875/djosse.v1i3.126>.
- Fitria Maharani Pratiwi. "Problematika Pergantianantar Waktu Anggota Legislatif Ditinjau dari Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 Tentang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah," no. July (2020).
- Hanafiah, Kemas Ali, Syarifuddin, and Gerby Novario. "DPR Honorary Council and the Enforcement of the Code of Ethics." *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure* 17, no. 4 (2017): 423–436. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2017.V17.423-436>.
- "Ketetapan MPR RI No. VI Tentang Etika Kehidupan Berbangsa," 2001.
- Kusuma, Fanila Kasmita. "Birokrasi Berintegritas: Fondasi Menuju Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Bersih." *Media Bina Ilmiah* 18, no. 6 (2024): 1527–36. <https://binapatria.id/index.php/MBI>.
- Mahbub, Muzayyin. "Dialektika Pembaruan Sistem Hukum Indonesia," 2012, 370.
- Martosoewignjo, Sri Soemantri. *Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia: Pemikiran Dan Pandangan*. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2014.
- Mawardi, Imam Al. *Al-Ahkam as-Sulthaniyyah: Hukum-Hukum Penyelenggaraan Negara Dalam Syariat Islam*. Jakarta Timur: Darul Falah, 2020.
- MD, Moh. Mahfud. *Politik Hukum Di Indonesia*. Revisi. Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2012.
- Norton, Philip. *Parliament in British Politics*. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Nur Ahmad Al Fai'q, Ahmad Faisal, Nur Fadillah, and Kurniati Kurniati. "Analisis Akuntabilitas Dan Transparansi Dalam Etika Politik Islam." *Sosial Simbiosis: Jurnal Integrasi Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik* 1, no. 3 (June 2024): 64–77. <https://doi.org/10.62383/sosial.v1i3.403>.
- Nurdin, Zamharira, A Muin Fahmal, Fahri Bachmid, Kata Kunci, : Kedudukan, Majelis Kehormatan, and Mahkamah Konstitusi. "Urgensi Kedudukan Majelis Kehormatan Mahkamah Konstitusi Ri Menurut UUD 1945." *Journal of Lex Philosophy (JLP)* 5, no. 2 (2024).
- Parliament, European. *Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament with Respect to Financial Interests and Conflicts of Interest*. Brussels: European Parliament, 2022.
- Peraturan DPR RI Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 tentang Kode Etik Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Pasal 1 angka 4 jo. Pasal 19–26. (n.d.).
- "Pro Kontra Penegakan Etik Secara Internal Dan Eksternal." *Jurnal Konstitusi Dan Demokrasi* 1, no. 1 (June 2021). <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkd.v1i1.1104>.

- Prof. Dr. H. Asep Kartiwa, Drs., S.H., M.S. *Sistem Politik Indonesia*. Edited by M.Si Drs. Beni Ahmad Saebani. CV. Pustaka Setia Bandung, 2013.
- Purwanto, Tegar Prayoga, Muhammad Masyeh Guruh Tuanaya, and Yehuda Natanael Thesti. "Mendorong Pembentukan Undang-Undang Etika Penyelenggara Negara Sebagai Instrumen Konstitusional Dalam Mengatasi Krisis Kepercayaan Publik." *Jurnal Kewarganegaraan* 9, no. 1 (2025): 64–75. <https://journal.upy.ac.id/index.php/pkn/article/view/8030>.
- Rakyat, Majelis Permusyawaratan. "Peraturan MPR Tentang Tata Tertib Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor 1," 2024.
- Ramadani, Rizki. "Lembaga Negara Independen Di Indonesia Dalam Perspektif Konsep Independent Regulatory Agencies." *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 27, no. 1 (January 2020). <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol27.iss1.art9>.
- Saputra, M Reza. "Analisis Potensi Implementasi Sistem Politik Tanpa Partai Di Indonesia Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Demokrasi Dan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan," 2024.
- Sholikah, Luluk Imro'atus, Nabela Setyawati, and Lutfi Firahayu. "Reformasi Marwah MK Melalui Pengembalian Pengawas Eksternal Hakim Konstitusi." *Sosio Yustisia Jurnal Hukum Dan Perubahan Sosial* 3, no. 2 (November 2023): 242–79. <https://doi.org/10.15642/sosyus.v3i2.522>.
- Syarifuddin, and Kemas Gerby Novario. "Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan (MKD) Dan Penegakan Kode Etik DPR RI (DPR Honorary Council and The Enforcement of The Code of Ethics)." *Kajian* 22, no. 1 (2017): 1–14. <https://repository.unsri.ac.id/67156/1/5>. Artikel Kajian 2017.pdf.
- Tardjono, Heriyono. "Urgensi Etika Profesi Hukum Sebagai Upaya Penegakan Hukum Yang Berkeadilan Di Indonesia." *Jurnal Kepastian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 2, no. 2 (2021): 51. <https://doi.org/10.32502/khdk.v2i2.3462>.
- Tarigan, Ridwan Syaidi. *Reformasi Hukum Tata Negara: Menuju Keadilan Dan Keseimbangan*. Ruang Berkarya, 2024.
- Tutik, Titik Triwulan. "Kedudukan Konstitusional Menteri Triumvirat Sebagai Pelaksana Tugas Kepresidenan Dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensil Di Indonesia." *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Perundangan Islam* 10, no. 2 (October 2020): 275–302. <https://doi.org/10.15642/ad.2020.10.2.275-302>.
- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ethics. "Home - House Committee on Ethics," 2026.
- Yandi, Muhammad Adystia Sunggara, Yang Meliana, Wahab Aznul Hidayah, Sokhib Nain, and Mawrni Fatma. "Dinamika Hukum Dan Korupsi Politik (Dampak Dan Tantangan Penegakan Hukum Di Indonesia)." *Unizar Law Review* 7, no. 1 (June 2024): 35–48. <https://doi.org/10.36679/ulr.v7i1.64>.